general law; welfare economics,

Please provide a model answer on question 1 of part A and question 4 of part B.

Question 1 – This is question 1 of part A. 

In this module, we discussed welfare economics, normative framework underlying law-and-economic analysis. Call someone who endorses of the commitments of welfare economics, as the module explained that framework, a Welfare Theorist. 

(a) What is maximising consequentialism? Are all Welfare Theorists consequentialists ? If no, explain why not. If yes, then identify Theorist would deny because the Welfare Theorist is committed to consequentialism – why it is the commitment to consequentialism that would require a consistent Welfare Theorist to deny the normative principle that you select. 

(b) What is welfarism? Are all Welfare Theorists welfarists? Explain the challenge to welfarism that we covered in the module and was offered by Amartya Sen. In your own words, explain how sen’s argument goes and how that argument is supposed to generate a challenge to welfarism. 

(c) As discussed in the module, according to the preference satisfaction view of individual utility, S’s utility in a situation reflects the extent to which S’s preferences would be satisfied if that situation were actual. One of the conceptions of what it means for S to prefer X to Y that we considered was the ‘Choice Ranking conception’ of preference. 

(i). Under what conditions does s prefer X to Y, according to the choice-Ranking? 

We also considered an argument by Daniel Hausman that relied heavily on obsenving choices that people like s make when S could choose X or choose Y According to argument, Welfare Theorists need not be committed to any particular conception of what s preferring X to Y is or even any particular view of what S’s individual utility actually reflects or s is. 

(ii). In your own words, explain how, When you do so, explain how, even though Hausman’s argument relies crucially on observing S’s choice-behaviour when faced with X or Y, the argument avoids any commitment to the “Choice Ranking conception of what it is for S to prefer X to Y. 

Question 2 – This is question 4 of part B. 

(a) In this module, we considered the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We discussed how the Prisoner’s Dilemma helps establish the following claim: Bargaining can enable us working together, to achieve efficient outcomes that might not otherwise be available to us your own words, explain how the Prisoner’s Dilemma helps establish this.

(b) In your own words, explain why the following is true, according to the standard law and economic account that we covered in the module: most reliable way, in general to calculate damages breaches will be efficient is to set damages for breach according to the expectation measure of damages. 

(c). In this module we considered the following question: How should we set damages for breaking a legally enforceable promise when the promise might rely on that promise, and too much reliance will increase the stakes associated with the risk that the promise is not kept? 

As we discussed in the module, although the expectation measure damages generally promotes efficient breaches, there is a concern that certain efficient transactions might not occur if we set damages according to a perfect expectation measure. This concern had something to do with the promise over-reliance on e’s the promisor’s promise. 

In your own words. explain how this concern about over-reliance preventing efficient transactions arises.

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